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Abstract 
The validity of most axioms which underlie the expected utility model has been the object of intense empirical testing. 
These include the independence, betweenness, transitivity, monotonicity, reduction, and non-satiation axioms. The 
sole, present-day test for the non-satiation axiom is predicated on the first-degree stochastic dominance theorem. This 
paper outlines the theory for a new, alternative test – one that is predicated on a mean-variance-preserving 
transformation of a one-trial binomial distribution.
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1. Introduction 
 
The theoretical foundations for the expected utility model were laid down by 
Daniel Bernoulli (1738), Frank Ramsey (1931), and John von Neumann and Oscar 
Morgenstern (1944). A detailed history of this model can be found in Schoemaker (1980 
and 1982). And overviews to empirical research into the expected utility model can be 
found in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Schoemaker (1980 and 1982), Machina (1987a 
and 1987b), and Yaqub et al. (2009).  
The validity of many axioms which underlie the expected utility model has been 
the object of intense empirical testing, beginning with Allais (1953). The independence, 
betweenness, transitivity, monotonicity, and reduction axioms have been subjected to 
empirical testing [Yaqub et al. (2009, p. 117)].  Levy and Levy (2001) have recently 
tested the validity of the non-satiation axiom, using the first-degree stochastic dominance 
theorem. 
This paper outlines a new, alternative approach to testing for the violation of the 
non-satiation axiom. The conceptual origin of this test is the mean-variance-preserving 
transformation of a one-trial binomial distribution due to Sproule (1993), which was 
motivated by the notion of downside risk due to Menezes et al. (1980). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a cursory review of three 
salient, background literatures. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework for our new 
test of the non-satiation axiom. Final remarks are offered in Section 4. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
To provide a context for the development of our new test, we offer here cursory 
comments on three background literatures. The first of these concerns the research by 
experimental psychologists into the preference orderings for simple lotteries that began 
more than a half a century ago. The second concerns elements of research into the first-
degree stochastic dominance theorem. The third concerns elements of research into the 
third-degree stochastic dominance theorem.   
 
2.1. The Research By Experimental Psychologists Into The Preference Orderings 
For Simple Lotteries:  Beginning perhaps with Daniel Bernoulli’s (1738) resolution of 
the St. Petersburg paradox, academics have shown a research interest in simple gambles. 
One possible reason for this interest is offered by Lola Lopez (1983), an experimental 
psychologist, who once observed: “The simple, static lottery or gamble is as 
indispensable to research on risk as the fruitfly to genetics. The reason is obvious: 
lotteries, like fruitflies, provide a simplified laboratory model of the real world, one that 
displays its essential characteristics while allowing for manipulation and control of 
important experimental variables” (p. 137).  
Lopez’s observation was directed at a now- or mostly-defunct research program, 
which was driven by experimental psychologists who endeavoured to discover the 
preference orderings held by their subjects for matched pairs of two- and three-outcome 
lotteries. This was a research program which began in the 1950s [e.g., Edwards (1953, 
1954, and 1955)], and which reached its zenith in the late 1960s [e.g., Slovic and 
Lichtenstein (1968)].    2
 
This same research program has two main avenues of inquiry. The first explores 
the preference orderings by held by experimental subjects for lottery pairs that differ in 
the magnitude of their probabilities versus the magnitude of their payoffs. The second 
explores the preference orderings for lottery pairs that differ in their central moments.  
This latter avenue of inquiry led to an interest in the theory of pairs of one- and 
two-trial binomial distributions that may differ by a mean-preserving transformation, or 
by a mean-variance-preserving transformation. Examples that capture the letter or the 
spirit of this can be found in Coombs and Pruitt (1960), van der Meer (1963), and Slovic 
and Lichtenstein (1968). And overviews to this literature can be found in Payne (1973), 
Libby and Fishburn (1977), and Schoemaker (1979).  
 
2.2. The First-Degree Stochastic Dominance Theorem: The first-degree stochastic 
dominance theorem is an integral part of a research program called stochastic dominance. 
“Stochastic dominance is a term which refers to a set of relations that may hold between a 
pair of distributions” [Davidson (2008)]. In economics and finance, stochastic dominance 
(more often than not) takes on a narrower definition, that being, the rank ordering of pairs 
of distributions, when the underlying analysis is coupled with the expected utility 
function [Hadar and Russell (1978)]. Thus, the notions of first-, second-, and third-degree 
stochastic dominance arise when a particular combination of restrictions is imposed upon 
the distributional pairs and on the associated von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
[Elton and Gruber (1981), Levy (1992 and 1998), Levy and Weiner (1998), and 
Wolfstetter (1999)]. 
In a recent study, Levy and Levy (2001) explored the applicability of notions of 
first- and second-degree stochastic dominance, in explaining the choices made by 
students of finance between lottery pairs. In their test of the first-degree stochastic 
dominance theorem, Levy and Levy (2001) asked the participants to state their preference 
between two lotteries, X and Y, which are defined as follows:  
 
Lottery  X       Lottery  Y 
Gain or loss   Probability     Gain or loss   Probability 
-500     1/3      -500     1/2 
+2500     2/3      +2500     1/2 
 
The first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) theorem predicts that the subjects or 
respondents will prefer Lottery X to Lottery Y. This prediction proved consistent with 
Levy and Levy’s (2001) data. They wrote: (a) that “95% of the subjects selected an 
alternative which conforms with FSD” and (b) that “most people are rational in the sense 
that they prefer more rather than less money” [Levy and Levy (2001, p. 238)]. It is 
important to note here, that by confirming the FSD theorem, Levy and Levy’s (2001) 
survey data also confirm the non-satiation axiom, because the non-satiation axiom is 
integral to the FSD theorem. 
 
2.3. The Third-Degree Stochastic Dominance Theorem And Mean-Variance-
Preserving Transformations:  In motivating their development and definition of the 
notion of “downside risk”, a notion which is tied to third-degree stochastic dominance   3
[Levy (1992)], Menezes et al. (1980) cited an empirical study by Mao (1970). In this 
study, Mao reported that: (a) the executives of eight medium and large companies were 
presented with a lottery pair, (b) both members of this pair had the same mean and 
variance, while one member was positively skewed, and the other was negatively 
skewed, and (c) these executives had no clear preference for either member. Mao 
reported that one third of his subjects chose the positively-skewed lottery, one third chose 
the negatively-skewed lottery, and the “remaining third indicated that their choice would 
depend on circumstances” (p. 349).  
For purposes of the analysis in Section 3, it should be noted here: (a) that Sproule 
(1993) developed a general analytical framework for the lottery pair used by Mao (1970), 
by defining the mean-variance-preserving transformation for the one-trial binomial 
distribution, and (b) that Sproule’s (1993) mean-variance-preserving transformation 
serves as the basis for the new, alternative test for the non-satiation axiom found below. 
 
3. A New Test For The Non-Satiation Axiom 
 
To define our test for the non-satiation axiom, we proceed as follows. First, we 
define two binary lotteries that differ by a mean-variance-preserving transformation. And 
second, we show that the relative ranking of these two lotteries by the expected utility 
function (hereafter EUF) depends on whether or not the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function adheres to the non-satiation axiom. 
 
3.1. Two Binary Lotteries, And Their Moments: Consider two binary lotteries, Lottery 
x and Lottery y, which are defined by three real-valued parameters, µ, α, and p, such that 
0 α µ <<  and 01 2 p << . In particular,  
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probabilities of  1 p −  and  p  respectively. 
 
Let E(z) denote the mean, V(z) denote the variance, and S(z) denote the skewness, 
of Lottery z, where z = x,y. The orderings of the first three moments of Lotteries x and y 
are as follows: 
 
Proposition 1 [Sproule (1993)]: If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then:  
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where E denotes the expectation operator, V denotes the second central-moment, 
variance, and S denotes the third central-moment, skewness. 
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3.2. A Preference Ordering Of Lotteries x and y: Let  () Uz denote the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, given z. By Assumption 1, the EUF for Lottery x is defined 
as,  
() [( ) ] ( 1 )
1
p
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and by Assumption 2, the EUF for Lottery y is defined as  
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We have shown that Lotteries x and y differ by their third central-moment 
[Proposition 1]. What remains to be shown is that the relative ranking of Lotteries x and y 
by the EUF depends on whether or not the non-satiation axiom is satisfied. Stated 
differently, we will show next that if and only if the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function satisfies the non-satiation axiom, then the EUF ranks Lottery y over Lottery x. In 
particular, 
 
Assumption 3 [Non-Satiation]: 
(1)() 0 Uz >  for all z. 
 
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 serve to define the preference ordering based on the 
EUF. 
 
Proposition 2: If Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, then  [ ( )] [ ( )] 0 EU x EU y − < . 
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3.3. Our New Test in Summary Form: To test the non-satiation axiom, the 
experimenter should present to the subject the choice between two lotteries, Lottery x and 
Lottery y (as defined by Propositions 1 and 2 above). If the subject prefers Lottery y over 
x, then he or she is said to satisfy the non-satiation axiom. But if the subject prefers 
Lottery x over Lottery y, or if the subject is indifferent between Lottery x and Lottery y, 
then he or she is said to violate the non-satiation axiom.  
 
4. Final Remarks 
 
The validity of most axioms which underlie the expected utility model has been 
the object of intense empirical testing. These include the independence, betweenness, 
transitivity, monotonicity, reduction, and non-satiation axioms. One test for the non-
satiation axiom is provided by the first-degree stochastic dominance theorem. This paper 
provided a second test, by virtue of a mean-variance-preserving transformation of a one-
trial binomial distribution. 
In Section 2, we offered a cursory review of three literatures that serve as the 
basis or foundation of the present research. And in Section 3, we presented our new test 
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